
Britain has told shipowners that satellite navigation can no longer be trusted in several of the world's busiest shipping regions. The UK's Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is urging crews to practice navigating without GPS as jamming and spoofing — the deliberate blocking or falsifying of satellite signals — become increasingly widespread.
MGN 719, a new Marine Guidance Note from the MCA, warns that interference across the Baltic, Black Sea, Middle East Gulf, and parts of East Asia means satellite-derived positioning, navigation, and timing information can no longer be relied upon everywhere. For shipowners and freight professionals coordinating cargo movements through these corridors, this is a direct operational risk, not a distant technical concern.
The warning extends well beyond electronic charts. The MCA identifies a long list of potentially vulnerable equipment, including:
Ashore, vessel traffic services, pilotage systems, port management platforms, and automated logistics systems are also exposed. For project cargo and industrial shipment coordinators, that shore-side exposure matters just as much as onboard risk, since delayed port systems can ripple through an entire supply chain.
The financial implications are considerable. Citing earlier UK government research, the MCA estimates that a seven-day GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) outage could cost the British maritime economy £1.5bn ($2bn), including £1.3bn in port operations alone. This figure underscores why even boutique freight operators should treat GNSS resilience as a planning priority, not an afterthought.
The guidance urges operators to:
Recommended backup techniques include radar fixing, visual bearings, celestial navigation, and dead reckoning — traditional skills now being repositioned as essential operational safeguards.
GPS interference is increasingly a routine operational hazard rather than an occasional inconvenience limited to conflict zones. Maritime intelligence firm Windward's latest figures show an average of 5,131 GPS jamming incidents a day during the third quarter, affecting more than 124,000 individual vessels.
Research published earlier this year by the Royal Institute of Navigation found that 14% of survey respondents had experienced an unsafe or unlawful situation resulting from GNSS interference.
In July, SplashTech reported on a government questionnaire, believed to have originated in Britain, asking ship operators whether their crews had conducted GNSS-denial drills, understood the vulnerabilities of interconnected bridge equipment, and could operate ECDIS in dead-reckoning mode.
More recently, SplashTech reported how four tankers in the Black Sea had apparently broadcast positions placing them in Lima, Peru — more than 12,000 km away. Separate monitoring identified 1,702 impossible position jumps involving 379 vessels in the Gulf of Oman over a single week in September.
The UK is investing in a terrestrial navigation backup through its enhanced Loran, or eLoran, programme. However, the MCA's latest guidance makes clear that technological alternatives will take time to become widely available: Britain's planned eLoran network is not expected to provide an initial timing capability until 2028, with full positioning and navigation services targeted for 2030.
Until then, the message to the global shipping industry — and to the freight forwarders and logistics operators who depend on it — is clear: build GNSS resilience into standard operating procedure now, rather than waiting for the next outage to force the issue.
Copyright: https://splash247.com/britain-urges-ships-to-prepare-for-life-without-reliable-gps/
Mr Sam Chambers